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Between social constructivism and
cynicism over scientific racism,
race-based science seemed, for
some, to be a dead end at the end of
the twentieth century. A new cultural acceptance of the social construction of race seemed apparent
in contentions over data collection
categories in the 2000 U.S. Census;
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sought to eliminate race categories
from Jefferson to Genomics edited
in data collection. At the same
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signal a pluralistic perspective, refusing to afford a genetic basis for
race categories. In 2005, drawing
on emerging discourses of sameness in genomic diversity, the National Geographic Society launched
its Genographic Project, which
asks volunteers to donate a DNA
sample to a database to track human migration patterns. In genetic
ancestry projects, enthusiasts use
noncoding markers to identify others with whom to compare family
trees. They also import other tools
of population genetics to identify
the “deep ancestry” or haplogroups,
which indicate a geographic origin
in prehistory. Recreational genomics is, with increasing frequency,
topical fare in popular media, including weekly newsmagazines
and mainstream Internet and
printed news sources. This fascination is perhaps most popularly and
poignantly visible in Oprah Winfrey and Henry Louis Gates Jr.’s
public pursuit of data about their
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African ancestors. Yet, postracial
politics notwithstanding, recreational genomics improvises a
racialized vernacular from understandings submerged in kinship,
tribe, and population narratives, as
Kimberly TallBear has pointed
out, mutating “race,” out of the
nineteenth-century concept of
“blood quantum” that imperfectly
signals complex tribal relatedness
and membership.1 Purchasers of
the kits look to the genome as the
“Book of Life,” finding themselves
as racialized and medicalized subjects, written in its pages.2 With
publicity generated by Winfrey,
Gates, and the Genographic Project, high school and college students, along with genealogists, are
experimenting with recreational
genomics and a mutated racial
discourse that accompanies testcompany promotional materials
and test interpretations. In a genomic age, race categories are experiencing a renaissance.
As these ongoing genetic reconstructions and deconstructions of
racial categories demonstrate, science has the authority to establish
truth claims that scholars in the
humanities must reckon with.
While students of American culture and history have long turned
to social science and literary sources
to make sense of racialization in
the United States, primary sources
from the history of science have
been less available for these
scholars. Partly, the preeminence
of scientific discourse and the

specialized genre of its literature
have made it a difficult target for
nonscientists to engage. Scholars in
the humanities may avoid a scientific debate either because they feel
out of their depths interpreting scientific data, assume that the scientific debates on race are settled, or
resist scientific authority in response to well-documented instances of scientific exploitation of
people of color. Or humanities
scholars may have surrendered to
science the work of settling matters of fact, keeping hermeneutics
and textual matters for themselves.
But researchers outside the sciences
have been hobbled by rejecting
science in a move that leaves untouched its power to legitimize
knowledge claims. Science and
technology studies can provide a
methodological resource that will
be ready to hand for literary studies: tracing objects through the
practices and discourses that produce them as settled matters of
fact, made, but not made up.
Race is a slippery object in scientific literature, and scholars in
the humanities will have a hard
time holding tight to both ends of
what Donna Haraway describes as
a “greased pole,” tracking the social and legal arrangements that
produce race while examining and
debunking scientific data claimed
to be evidence for or against race.3
Here, Evelynn Hammonds (Harvard University) and Rebecca
Herzig’s (Bates College) edited
volume will be a useful resource
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with a welcome approach. Attuned to discursive strategies
across decades of scientific literature, historians of science Hammonds and Herzig present a
selection of fifty-seven primary
documents that elucidate scientific
understandings of racial difference from Thomas Jefferson’s 1782
“suspicion” that “blacks . . . are inferior to the whites” (28) to contemporary arguments about the
scientific validity of the concept of
race, played out in anthropology
and genomics. “Science” is coded
as the interpreter of “Nature” in
Western discourse; The Nature of
Difference is a play on words made
possible by that slippage, a play
that simultaneously reminds the
reader of the elision. Hammond
and Herzig, in fine analytic form,
throw the spotlight on how scientific practices across disciplines describe and create what thereby
becomes naturalized difference,
rather than describe the essence of
difference itself.
Hammond and Herzig’s attention to the distinction between scientific processes that stabilize
racial facts and the facticity of scientific arguments is sustained in
commentary and the organization
of the source material. An astute
general introduction explains the
rationale for the selection of the
pieces, most of which are reproduced in full. Each of the nine
thematic sections also has a separate introduction, with questions
that point readers to the discursive
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moves and modes of attention of
each author rather than to a pedantic exploration of racism that
is stark in some of the articles.
Herzig and Hammond focus on
race in the United States, fittingly
as the United States developed
particular forms of race science
in conjunction with institutionalized slavery at the founding of
the nation. Racial understandings
were perpetuated in new forms
with westward expansion and at
the end of legal slavery. Several
selections take the racialization
of Africans or American Indians
head on, whereas others talk about
“races” generally. Given the specific histories of Chinese exclusion,
a selection specifically addressing
the racialization of Asians in the
United States seems to be an omission, although one article about
the state of public health in San
Francisco infers anxiety over Chinese immigration at the same time
it constructs a version of appropriate white femininity around
cleanliness and sensitivity to disease, and Hammond and Herzig
give Chinese immigration due
consideration in the introduction
to this section. Obviously, the editors are unable to include the vast
archive of source material that
might address this and other questions of racialization in the United
States. This predicament is rectified by the inclusion of a bibliography of materials for further
study at the end of each section’s
introduction.
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The editors purposely avoid
settling on a particular definition
or understanding of race, but attempt to show the unsettled and
ongoing nature of the debate.
They ask readers to track the rise
and permutation of various features of the arguments. For example, in the introduction to a
section titled “Anatomical Observations,” the editors ask, “In what
larger political, economic, and social contexts might ears, noses, index fingers, or brain hemispheres
attract attention as reliable signs
of racial difference?” (17). Jefferson’s now-shocking assertion that
blacks prefer white sensibilities,
just as a male orangutan prefers
an African woman to a female of
its own species, comes in the middle of an elaboration of differences
Jefferson thought were pertinent:
fair skin that readily shows a
blush; the alleged heat tolerance
and cold intolerance of black people; the quality of sweat (25).
Readers will see how some of
these dubious distinctions remain
present in people’s personal constructions of race.
Herzig and Hammond avoid
the debunking strain of some
histories of science that traced personal bias, logical leaps, and methodological failures that produced
false evidence of racial difference
and validated the prevailing racial
hierarchies. They instead “approach science not as a single instrument or method that reveals
(or obscures) the real truth about

human difference but instead, like
race, as a profoundly heterogeneous array of practices” (ix). The
editors’ selection rationale and organization support this endeavor,
and make the text usable for scholars across disciplinary contexts
who study race. The heterogeneity
of practices is apparent from the
get-go: The first section, which
reproduces fifteen dictionary definitions of race, from medicine, biology, anthropology, genetics, and
evolution, and spanning the late
nineteenth through early twentyfirst centuries, shows the mutability of the object and fraught
efforts to settle and circumscribe
the notion.
The remaining sections chart
sites where racial differences might
be found (hair, glands, lungs, birth
canals, genes); methods that might
specify them (counting sweat
glands, measuring skin pigmentation, assessing skeletal differences,
sequencing genes); anxieties over
contagion of disease or race; what
hybridity tells us about differences.
These selections trace the shifting
terms and methods that produce
difference, and remind us that scientific communication is itself a
procedure for establishing scientific matters of fact. For example,
the section “Immunity and Contagion” features an 1887 debate
between physicians Washington
Matthews and Thomas Mays over
interpretations of the prevalence of
consumption amongst American
Indians. The terms of this
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argument—whether consumption
was a sign of inborn racial difference, or ameliorated by “civilizing”
factors that could affect the incidence of the disease—helped settle
the fates of Native Americans at
the close of the West and after
more than fifty years of official removal policy. Science brings about
the worlds it often claims only to
describe.
The ultimate fate of racial
groups is also a preoccupation evident in discussions in the following
section on “Evolution and Degeneration.” Culminating in a 1914
essay by Alexander Graham Bell
on positive eugenics, this section
tracks the anxieties of a nation
reckoning with Emancipation and
the fulfillment of a manifest destiny to occupy the continent from
coast to coast. Adaptation to new
environments signals evolution;
conveniently, groups that instead
degenerated would eventually
cease to exist. High mortality rates
could signal problems in work and
living conditions, or a congenital
inability to adapt to those conditions. Sexual dimorphism was
thought to be a component of
degeneration, so considerations of
race and sex together are more
explicit here, though implicit
throughout the collection. Just as
genetics discourses are heavyweights in public rhetorical spaces
now, each of these scientific
explanations played a role in policy
and popular conceptions of race in
its day.
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The options on offer for nonscientists to engage scientific knowledge production have seemed to
avoid toeing the putative line between science and society that
shields the sciences from social
interference. This is the line that
Stephen Jay Gould unwittingly defended when he recalculated cranial capacities to argue that bias
resulted in skewed data that maligned Africans.4 Thus society becomes the scapegoat in any scientific
failure, and truth is realized by
good science when social interests
are kept out. Better than that,
science should be instructive to
society, as Aravinda Chakravarti
argues in a recent article on recreational genomics in Nature: “More
often than not, the views of society
have shaped science rather than
the other way around. In this instance, it may be time for science to
reshape the views of society.”5 In
this view, which sees cultural and
social processes as distinct from
scientific ones, society should, at
last, accept the hard truths on offer
from science. This assumption was
on display when University of Chicago geneticist Bruce Lahn defended his 2005 research showing that
brain size had responded to selection pressures, coinciding with the
emergence of culture in Europe.
Unfortunately, the alleles Lahn
found had a low incidence in subSaharan Africa. When Lahn’s data
were reanalyzed by other researchers, casting doubt on his claims,
Lahn argued that it is other
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scientists who “start with a political agenda and fit the evidence to
that.”6 His supporters claimed a
social interest—political correctness—had interfered with the
dogged pursuit of truth.
From here, it looks like those
with an “agenda” produced a better account of Lahn’s data, calling
into question the account of science
as an activity best transacted outside of and separate from society
(as if that were possible). More than
this, contemporary genetics research illustrates that science’s
power to beguile imaginations
works on those in the humanities,
too, some of whom have turned to
genomics testing to discover and
reveal “truths” about unknown
ancestry, an apocryphal African or
European cropping up in the
family tree. The allure here is to
finally prove we’re all the same under the skin, or at least that we
have more in common than we had
liked to admit. If this premise
seems too neat, readers of The
Nature of Difference will also be
able to trace the evolution of this
aspiration from its context after the
Second World War and the Holocaust, and see how this project is
another one for making race
matter, but differently.
The Nature of Difference is a
timely addition to conversations
about race and genomics, organized so as to allow readers to make
new connections between contemporary discourses and the histories
of science and race. The text’s

selections and the organization of
the selections with introductory
material are especially helpful,
serving as navigational aids to the
sometimes astounding statements
of racial fact that could otherwise
be conversation stoppers. The book
would be useful either as a course
text or as a collection of primary
material for individual research.
Students wishing to track the scientific construction of sex and sexuality more directly alongside race
should consider pairing this text
with Lucy Bland and Laura Doan’s
1998 edited volume of primary
sources, Sexology Uncensored. For
those looking for analysis of the
production of genetic racial difference, Revisiting Race in a Genomic
Age, edited by Barbara Koenig,
Sandra Soo-Jin Lee, and Sarah
Richardson (2008), keys its essays
to genomics, race-based medicine,
and genetic ancestry, while Genetic
Nature/Culture, edited by Alan
Goodman, Deborah Heath, and
M. Susan Lindee (2003), offers an
anthropological approach and respected scholars in science studies
(Troy Duster, Sarah Franklin, Joan
Fujimura, Donna Haraway, Rayna
Rapp, and Hilary Rose, to name
just a selection). Both of these essay
collections would help students see
how the analytic questions suggested by Hammonds and Herzig
open up the apparently settled
domain of science for productive
interdisciplinary inquiry.
—Wayne State University
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